Somalia

Somalia pirate attacks reach record levels

Pirates have been in the news regularly over the last few months and are a great cause for concern in many parts of the world regularly visited by merchant shipping. In this article, Captain Mukundan, Director of the ICC International Maritime Bureau, provides an insight into the recent surge in pirate activities off Somalia and suggests some of the protective measures that should be taken.

In 2005, the Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) run by the ICC International Maritime Bureau (IMB) recorded a drop in attacks against vessels worldwide for the second year in succession. A total of 276 attacks were recorded last year compared to 325 attacks in 2004.

However, despite the headline numbers, there are still areas of concern. A total of 440 crew were taken hostage in 2005, the highest since the PRC started compiling statistics in 1992, and the number of hijackings rose to 23, the highest since 2002.

New hotspots of piracy also emerged in 2005. For example, there were no attacks recorded in Iraq in 2004 yet in 2005 there were 10 attacks against vessels waiting to berth at the Basrah Oil Terminal or off Umm Qasr. The pirates are well-armed - as one would expect in a country awash with weapons - and have shot at crew members causing serious injuries. Analysis reveals that the purpose of these attacks appears to be to steal cash, personal effects and small pieces of equipment rather than anything more sinister.

Somalia arguably became the highest risk area in 2005. In 2004, there were two attacks reported to the PRC whereas, from 15 March 2005 to the end of the year, 35 attacks were recorded. The purpose of these attacks is to hijack the vessels, force them well inside Somali waters and then demand a ransom for the return of the vessel and its crew. In all except one case, no attempt was made to steal the cargo. Vulnerable vessels such as tankers and gas carriers have been hijacked and returned only after a substantial ransom was paid.

Long-range attacks
Many of the attacks took place hundreds of miles off the Somali coast, well outside the territorial limits of Somalia. On 8 November 2005, a general cargo vessel proceeding from the Mozambique Channel towards Pakistan was attacked 390 miles off the coast.

Such attacks cannot be done by small pirate craft operating on their own. In these long-range attacks pirate mother ships provide support. The mother ship, which is typically a large fishing trawler or a motorised dhow with a single derrick at the stern, will steam towards the course of an approaching target vessel. When the target vessel draws close, the mother ship launches one or two fast boats with powerful outboard motors and around six pirates each on board, armed with automatic weapons and, in some cases, rocket-propelled grenade launchers. These craft close in on the target vessel at speed, firing on the bridge windows of the vessel. If the vessel slows down or stops, the vessel will be boarded and hijacked.

In one case, a bulk carrier was boarded by pirates who were unable to get into the accommodation. All access to the accommodation block had been secured from the inside by the crew. Frustrated, the pirates set fire to a life boat. The Master, fearing for his crew managed to fire a distress flare from a porthole. A passing LPG carrier seeing the flames from the burning lifeboat and the distress flare altered course to provide assistance. As it drew close the pirates abandoned the bulk carrier, emerged from its lee and approached the LPG carrier threatening to fire its rocket-propelled grenade launcher. The master slowed down, was boarded and hijacked. It took three weeks of anxious negotiations before the vessel was finally released.

Once a vessel is hijacked and taken into Somali waters, foreign naval vessels will not usually intervene. The number of pirates on board will typically increase to about 15 - enough to keep the crew under control and deter other gangs from seizing the 'prize'. Then begin the tortuous negotiations with intermediaries ashore.

At the time of writing, there are currently five vessels in pirate captivity four fishing vessels and one general cargo vessel. In early November 2005 after a rash of hijackings, seven vessels and over 100 seamen were captured.

A pirate group under the name 'National Voluntary Coastguard' operates from Kismayo Island south of Mogadiscio specialising in seizing fishing vessels allegedly for breaching national fishing regulations. Other centres of pirate activity appear to be Xarardheere, Hobyo and a group operating off Cap Guardafui in north-east Somalia.

Responding to the threat
Dealing with piracy in Somalia poses unique challenges. This is a country with no effective national government and hence no national legal or law-enforcement infrastructure. Except for the a few provinces in northern Somalia which are reasonably well governed, the rest of the country is controlled by local militias, some of which see piracy as an additional income stream.

It is vital that shipmasters report every sighting of suspicious activity off the coast of Somalia to the PRC. This information is passed to the Coalition naval forces in the region and forms vital intelligence in the fight against Somali piracy.

On 20 January 2006, a bulk carrier reported to the PRC an attempted attack by a mother ship and her two attack craft over 200 miles off the Somali coast. This information was promptly relayed to the Coalition naval authorities. The USS Winston Churchill and other naval vessels responded. After shadowing a suspicious craft through the night of 20 January, it was finally boarded by US naval personnel on the morning of 21 January and 10 Somalis and 16 Indians on board have been detained. The Indians claimed that the Somalis had hijacked their vessel and used it as a pirate mother ship to attack a number of merchant vessels off the coast. It is precisely this kind of naval response which will bring about a long-term reduction in piracy in these waters. It cannot be done without prompt reports from masters and the key role played by the PRC.

In reporting attacks, it is also relevant to note that many purse-seiner fishing trawlers launch their boats to lay their nets over a wide area, up to a mile away from the trawler. These boats cannot alter course easily to avoid a passing merchant vessel and sometimes may appear as if they are chasing the merchant vessel. However, what distinguishes a genuine fishing craft from a pirate craft are the nets trailing from the craft - and the lack of a large number of armed pirates on board!

The IMB advises merchant vessels not calling at Somali ports to sail at least 200 nautical miles away from the coast. We further advise vessels to keep a close lookout for suspicious craft in the vicinity and alter course to pass well clear of them, away from the mother vessel and preferably away from the Somali coast. As the pirate craft operate from the mother vessel, the further away the target vessel, the less likely it is they will attack.

The experience of masters who have avoided boarding is that the pirate craft will give up the chase after about 40 minutes if they are drawn away from the mother vessel and further away from the Somali coast.

Vital role of Coalition navy
Coalition naval units play a key role. Legally they can intervene outside Somali territorial limits. In our view, they should stop and search suspicious craft on the high seas, in an area where recent attacks have been reported by the PRC. Vessels carrying a suspiciously large quantity of arms on board should be further investigated and crew questioned. Issues remain as to what the naval vessel will do if their investigations confirm those questioned as pirates. Neither the flag State nor the coastal State, Somalia, may wish to or be able to take over the investigation and prosecute.

Once a vessel has been hijacked a naval unit can, if they have the right boarding teams available, attempt to board the vessel. The objective is to diffuse the situation peacefully. This may not always be achievable. At the very least they can prevent the vessel from heading into the pirate's 'comfort zone', the 12 mile Somali territorial limit. It may persuade the pirates to choose the safer option of abandoning the hijacked vessel.

The presence of an active coalition naval unit in a piracy hotspot has had an immediate deterrent effect on pirate activity. It sends a clear signal that these waters are not a pirate's charter and illegal activity will be investigated. The converse is also true, in that the absence of naval units from hotspots for a sustained period encourages pirate activity. Recent history has shown that the longer the absence of the naval units, the more audacious the attacks.

In a country torn by civil strife, the response must fall to agencies outside the government. The neighbouring countries lack the resources to patrol the long Somali coastline. The IMO referred the issue of Somali piracy to the UN secretary general in December 2005 and it is hoped that this matter will be raised at the UN Security Council.

Despite the challenges, in the unusual circumstances of Somalia, the Coalition naval units are the only forces which can make a difference on the water, in the short term. We should support them in their task.

For the purposes of this article 'piracy' and 'pirates' refer to incidents which fall under the definition of piracy in article 101 of UNCLOS and 'armed attack' under the IMO MSC/Circ.984 article 2.2 (The Code of Practice).